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Melancholy vaporised: self-narration and counter-diagnosis in Rousseau’s work 
Rudy Le Menthéour 
 
Before the clinical revolution which, according to Michel Foucault, occurred at the end of the 
eighteenth century,1 the narration of singular cases was at least as important as the strict classification 
of symptoms: nosology had not yet fixed the manifold stories of pain. Of course, modern-day 
physicians still rely heavily on the narratives told by their patients, but they are usually much less prone 
to take idiosyncrasies into account, and much quicker to make symptoms fit pre-established patterns. In 
the eighteenth century, the attention paid to a patient’s specific ailments also ensured that there was a 
delicate balance between lay voices and professional expertise. At a time when the Republic of Letters 
was more active than ever, the practice of consulting by letter largely shaped medical narration, as 
Philip Rieder and David Shuttleton show in their articles in this volume.2 Epistolary consultations let 
the lay voices of – admittedly literate – patients engage local, national and international networks of 
physicians, who shared advice on how to diagnose their specific pathologies and how to cure their 
ailments.3 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, one of the most vigorous critics of both medicine and physicians, 
was nonetheless part of this entangled network of lay and professional communications. As a patient, 
he was no exception to the common practice of consulting physicians through both visits and letters. 
He even took advantage of his prominent position as a man of letters to consult the most famous 
physicians of the time, such as Théodore Tronchin and Samuel-Auguste Tissot. Rousseau consulted 
physicians in accordance with his overall persona: he seemed to set himself aside from commoners by 
displaying an unusual taste for controversy and by engaging in constant denials. 
 
In fact, Rousseau did not reject medicine as much as he claimed. Far from rejecting all 
practitioners, he constantly favoured – both in theory and in practice – neo-Hippocratic physicians who 
relied mostly on hygiene, and surgeons, whom he deemed less prone than doctors to conjuring up 
meaningless systems. His choices as a patient were consistent with his polemical strategy. He launched 
attacks on physicians as an established body and criticised medicine as a vain discipline. He strove to 
deprive the field of medicine of any legitimacy both internally – by separating hygiene from its mother 
discipline4 – and externally – by celebrating the physicians’ main rivals in the struggle for social 
recognition, namely surgeons.5 This discrepancy between Rousseau’s confrontational posture and his 
actual reliance on medical discourse is worth exploring. Apart from his general statements against 
medicine, Rousseau elaborated an original self-narration aimed at preserving his public image – an 
image he perceived to be threatened by defamatory diagnoses.6 
 
All roads lead to Montpellier 
 
According to his correspondence and the Confessions,7 in 1737 Rousseau made a trip to Montpellier in 
order to consult Dr Antoine Fizes. In his autobiography, Rousseau claims that he chose this physician 
because he suspected his constant palpitations were caused by a polyp of the heart, a very fashionable 
affliction since Marcello Malpighi’s anatomical observations (De polypo cordis, 1666), and, more 
decisively, a pathology Dr Fizes had treated successfully, according to Claude Anet’s account. But 
Dr Fizes was also a recognised specialist of vapours, and he probably diagnosed Rousseau with a 
‘vaporous affection’, if we may infer his diagnosis by considering the treatment he ordered for his 
patient. In a letter he sent to Mme de Warens during his stay in Montpellier, Rousseau mentions ‘eaux, 
bouillons de poulet, purgatifs, bains’, and announces his plan to enjoy some ‘air excellent’ and to drink 
‘le lait d’ânesse en Provence’.8 If one compares this treatment with a prescription letter sent by 
Dr Fizes to Mr de La Roquette – a patient diagnosed with a ‘melancholic affection’ – it becomes 
obvious that the famous physician established the same kind of diagnosis when Rousseau consulted 
him: 
Le battement que le malade sent en différentes parties de la tête & du bas-ventre [...] établissent 
une affection mélancolique, dont la cause est un sang épais, sec & acrimonieux, avec trop de 
tension des filets nerveux. [...] [O]n fera les remedes suivants. On commencera par une saignée 
au bras de la valeur de huit onces; on purgera le lendemain [...]. 
 On passera ensuite à l’usage des bouillons [...]. 
 Ayant pris ce petit lait [de vache] dix matins, on purgera le malade comme auparavant, 
pour passer tout de suite à l’usage du lait d’ânesse, qu’il prendra le matin à jeûn, à la dose de 
douze à seize onces, pendant deux mois. [...] 
 Au surplus, le malade observera exactement un bon régime de vivre. Il se nourrira de 
soupes, de bouilli, de rôti. [...] Il boira le vin bien choisi, vieux, & rouge, mais toujours mêlé 
avec trois fois autant d’eau. Il fera de l’exercice, mais modéré, & se dissipera par quelques 
amusements honnêtes.9 
Even Dr. Fizes’ cheerful advice to drink wine from time to time, which Rousseau reported to Bernardin 
de Saint-Pierre and which R. A. Leigh considers as contradicting the Confessions10 – is consistent with 
the doctor’s specific treatment of vapours.11 ‘Drink wine and have fun’ was not only the way common 
sense responded to melancholy, it was also the medical oracle of the best hygienists of the day. Lastly, 
this consultation letter also shows that, in the context of eighteenth-century medical discourse, 
Rousseau was not entirely wrong in suspecting a polyp of the heart. Dr Fizes probably considered that 
his patient was merely exaggerating the real cause of both vapours and palpitations (i.e. blood 
thickened by an inappropriate lifestyle). 
 
Whatever the real cause of Rousseau’s ailments might have been, it is remarkable that the 
patient later denied the Montpellier physician’s diagnosis. In his autobiographical account, Rousseau 
formulated a retrospective alternate self-diagnosis based on a keen description of symptoms: ‘Mes 
battemens d’artéres étoient terribles, mes palpitations plus fréquentes, j’étois continuellement oppressé, 
et ma foiblesse enfin devint telle que j’avois peine à me mouvoir; je ne pouvois soulever le plus leger 
fardeau; j’etois reduit à l’inaction la plus tourmentante pour un homme aussi remuant que moi. Il est 
certain qu’il se mêloit à tout cela beaucoup de vapeurs.’12 At first glance, one may interpret the last 
statement as euphemistic (‘these ailments I perceived as physical were actually mere vapours’). One 
could also consider, however, that Rousseau was using the discourse of nosology that was common in 
his day, as most physicians painstakingly distinguished simple from complicated vapours.13 They 
implied that physico-moral conditions like vapours could combine with different physical pathologies, 
thus further confusing the symptoms of both realms, multiplying the emergence of apparently new 
diseases, and making the diagnosis much more difficult than for any simple ailment. This interpretation 
is consistent with Rousseau’s further statement that his vapours vanished on the road to Montpellier 
thanks to the entertainment he found there, and that he had been left with suffering simple physical 
pains: 
J’avois oublié durant ma route que j’étois malade; je m’en souvins en arrivant à Montpellier. 
Mes vapeurs étoient bien guéries, mais tous mes autres maux me restoient [...]. J’allai consulter 
les praticiens les plus illustres, surtout M. Fizes [...]. Il étoit clair que mes medecins, qui 
n’avoient compris à mon mal, me regardoient comme un malade imaginaire et me traitoient sur 
ce pied avec leur squine, leurs eaux et leur petit lait.14 
Although the young Jean-Jacques complied with M. Fizes’ diagnosis and prescriptions, Rousseau the 
narrator retrospectively established an alternate self-diagnosis. Thanks to the powers of narration, he 
was able to diagnose himself prior to the consultation, thus undermining its authority by anticipation. 
Generally speaking, Rousseau denied the physicians any kind of expertise or ability to draw a clear line 
between the moral and the physical. Because they lacked the true art of semiotics, and confused the two 
sides of man, physicians deserved to be castigated as bad interpreters of human nature – along with 
cabinet philosophers who imagined a natural sociability, and bad parents who misread their children’s 
longing for power as signs of dependency.15 
 
Ethos and counter-diagnosis 
 
Rousseau’s attitude towards the physicians he was willing to consult was characterised by constant 
denial and growing distrust, with the remarkable exception of his relationship with Samuel-Auguste 
Tissot. A letter he sent to Dr François Thierry in 1758 very well captures this ambivalence when asking 
professional advice from a man of that art. After having written to his doctor and ‘former friend’16 
about how ineffective his prescription had been and harshly countered his diagnosis,17 Rousseau 
persisted in detailing his symptoms, while claiming the absolute singularity of his pathology: 
Je vous dis cela, persuadé que mon mal n’a jamais été connu de personne, et qu’on pourroit 
peut-être tirer quelques observations utiles à la médecine. Je ne vous consulte point d’ailleurs; 
je n’attends ni ne veux plus aucune espèce de soulagement de la part des hommes, mais 
seulement de celui qui sait consoler des maux de cette vie par l’attente d’une meilleure.18 
On other occasions, Rousseau’s reasons for rejecting a diagnosis were more obvious. Théodore 
Tronchin’s friendship with Voltaire, his proximity to the Genevan patricians, and his betrayal of 
Rousseau’s most excruciating secret, constituted an impressive list of possible grievances.19 Still, this 
enumeration offers but a partial explanation of Rousseau’s deep-seated hostility towards a physician 
(and a former friend) he had once consulted with deference. In fact, Rousseau probably resented 
Tronchin’s straightforward diagnoses. 
 
The first diagnosis can be inferred from biographic speculation. While staying in Venice (1743-
1744), Rousseau first suffered urinary retention – a condition he would endure for the rest of his life – 
and feared it might have been caused by a venereal disease contracted by paying a visit to a famous 
Venetian prostitute, la Padoana. Despite the diagnosis made by a surgeon who convinced him he was 
formed in such a way as not to be infected,20 a relapse forced him to consult numerous other physicians 
and surgeons. Tronchin was an obvious choice. In spite of the distance, however – the physician living 
in Geneva and the philosopher in Paris – Rousseau rejected an intermediary’s offer to consult him by 
letter, and claimed he preferred seeing him in person.21 One of his reasons for doing so may have been 
a reluctance to reveal to Tronchin – and thus potentially to his extended professional network – a list of 
symptoms that could have established the reality of a venereal infection. Rousseau never went to 
Geneva to be examined by Tronchin, but Tronchin came to Paris in 1756, leading his crusade for 
inoculation and successfully treating Rousseau’s hostess at Montmorency, Mme d’Epinay. Rousseau 
may have taken advantage of this proximity to be examined at that time. Whatever happened in Paris, 
some years later, James Boswell would quote Tronchin’s defamatory rumours about Rousseau by 
naming him ‘a man ruined by venereal diseases’.22 In his will, Rousseau requested that his body would 
be autopsied in order to prove how exceptional his pathology had been, and thus strike a fatal blow to 
the infamous diagnosis that was threatening his public image: 
L’étrange maladie qui me consume depuis trente ans [...] est si différente de toutes les autres 
maladies du même genre et avec lesquelles les medecins et les chirurgiens l’ont toujours 
confondue que je crois qu’il importe à l’utilité publique qu’elle soit examinée après ma mort 
dans son siége même. [...] Je déclare au surplus n’avoir jamais eu aucune des maladies qui 
souvent donnent lieu à celles de cette espéce, en quoi j’avoue n’avoir à me vanter que de mon 
bonheur; ce que je dis là est certain et j’insiste sur cette affirmation parce que des médecins et 
chirurgiens ont sur ce point refusé de me croire et ils ont eu tort.23 
There is much more evidence about the second diagnosis, which Rousseau refused many times. He was 
deemed melancholic by followers and adversaries alike. Such a diagnosis was brought to his attention 
by profane and medical correspondents, and each time Rousseau replied with defiance. Rousseau 
resented Tronchin’s comments all the more because it seemed as if the physician wanted to establish 
with Rousseau the moral advisory role he was already playing with Mme d’Epinay, in addition to being 
her physician. He admonished the Citizen of Geneva in these terms: 
Mais dites-moi, comment se fait-il, ou plustot comment se peut-il faire, que l’ami de l’humanité 
ne le soit presques plus des hommes? [...] Je soupçonne, mon cher Monsieur, que votre 
indifférence, je me sers du nom le plus doux, tient à deux causes, au point du globe où vous 
vous trouvez, & à votre mauvaise santé; car j’estime que nos principes sont les mêmes, mais je 
me porte bien, & je suis ici. L’humeur aqueuse de mon œil & son cristallin transmettent à 
l’organe immediat de ma vue les rayons tels qu’ils sont. Ils ne reçoivent dans ce trajet aucune 
teinte qui les altère.24 
This extract presents us with a compendium of the typical reproaches Rousseau received from his 
contemporaries. Tronchin, as one may expect, associated misanthropy – euphemised as ‘indifference’ – 
with melancholy, and ironically referred to the obsolete theory of vision altered by black bile. He thus 
implied that his correspondent had been made delusional and asocial by a melancholic condition that he 
ascribed to voluntary isolation and pre-existing poor health. 
 
This diagnosis by Tronchin was not exceptional. Other physicians increasingly referred to 
Rousseau as the epitome of the man of letters stricken by melancholy, hypochondria or vapours, 
pathologies that tended to overlap at that time. Even those who found inspiration in his work, like 
Dr Johann Georg Zimmermann, a German friend of Samuel-Auguste Tissot, characterised Rousseau’s 
case as a self-evident example of meditation-induced diseases: 
Celse dit que tous les gens de lettres ont l’estomac foible; & qu’ils sont, par cette raison, 
presque tous pâles, maigres ou tristes. [...] Quand Rousseau ne parle pas, il penche la tête 
jusqu’à la poitrine; attitude de la réflexion & de la tristesse. 
Dans ces circonstances, il se joint à la foiblesse des nerfs une mobilité plus grande [...]. 
Voilà pourquoi les gens de lettres sont si faciles à irriter, si susceptibles, si prompts à prendre 
feu.25 
Zimmermann, Tissot and Rousseau certainly agreed on the hygienic principle that ‘il vaudroit mieux, 
pour la santé, être bûcheron qu’homme de lettres.’26 Rousseau, however, strongly refused to be held as 
a perfect illustration of a man of letters afflicted by a pathology specific to a professional category. On 
the contrary, he constantly emphasised that he had engaged in a literary career by accident, driven by a 
quest for truth far remote from the self-liking (amour-propre) that governed his peers. It was part of his 
polemical strategy to avoid being cast as a typical man of letters that he claimed his physical disease to 
be absolutely exceptional, and his moral ailments completely circumstantial. By making such claims, 
Rousseau tried to make his ethos consistent with the hygienic overtones of his ‘theory of man’. 
 
Was Rousseau successful in his attempt to reshape his public image by presenting his readers 
with a counter-narration? If we take into account the numerous depictions of Rousseau made by his 
contemporaries, we must conclude that his rhetorical strategy failed in that respect. His reputation as a 
melancholic man extended far beyond the circle of physicians, and many testimonies by lay observers 
considered the causes of his condition without further detail, and supported the melancholy diagnosis. 
David Hume thus considered that his famous – and difficult – guest had ‘frequent and long fits of the 
spleen, from the state of his mind or body, call it which you please, and from his extreme sensibility of 
temper’.27 Analysis of Rousseau’s behaviour could even be dispensed with, as his physiognomy 
betrayed melancholy to his contemporaries. According to his admirer Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, ‘[o]n 
remarquait dans son visage trois ou quatre caractères de la mélancolie par l'enfoncement des yeux et 
par l'affaissement des sourcils.’28 In this context, the circulation of engravings of Rousseau as a 
melancholic philosopher only exacerbated his frustration at not being able to reverse the powerful tide 
of public opinion. When Rousseau accused Hume of having deliberately distorted his appearance by 
asking the painter Ramsay to picture him as a ‘Cyclope affreux’,29 he was fighting a diagnosis that 
threatened his public image. 
 
‘Je n’ai pas naturellement de la melancholie’30 
 
The fact that Rousseau resented his own celebrity and misinterpreted emerging public opinion as a 
conspiracy should not prevent us from taking his rhetorical endeavours seriously.31 When he thought 
that his attempts at winning the hearts of his contemporaries were doomed to failure, he strove for 
public redemption beyond his death. His Confessions were supposed to present posthumously to the 
readers the key to his past behaviour by revealing the secret chain of ‘affections’ that explained all of 
his actions. Such disclosure of his inner workings, going deep under the skin – intus et in cute (to quote 
the epigraph he borrowed from Persus) – was the moral equivalent of the justificatory autopsy he called 
for in his will.32 This moral autopsy was partly grounded in a self-diagnosis directed against the 
diagnosis of ingrained melancholy formulated by his contemporaries. Rousseau did not dismiss the 
melancholic diagnosis altogether: he resorted to a subtler strategy by presenting himself as the victim 
of circumstantial vapours. In this respect, his self-diagnosis seemed much closer to Dr Fizes’ hygienic 
approach than to the way most contemporaries portrayed him as predisposed to melancholy. When 
describing his symptoms, he was intent both on showing his mastery of semiotics and on avoiding 
being cast either as a melancholic by temperament or as another victim of the sedentary lifestyle shared 
by men of letters: ‘[J]’avois la courte haleine; je me sentois oppressé: je soupirois involontairement, 
j’avois des palpitations, je crachois du sang; la fièvre lente survint et je n’en ai jamais été bien quitte. 
Comment peut-on tomber dans cet état à la fleur de l’age, sans avoir aucun viscére vicié, sans avoir rien 
fait pour détruire sa santé?’33 The symptoms described by Rousseau coincide with the semiology of 
vapours that was common in his time. Sophie, a patient mentioned by Dr Pierre Hunauld in his treaty 
on vapours, used the very same expressions to characterise her ailments: ‘Je sentois ma poitrine 
oppressée; & ce n’étoit qu’après de longs & profonds soupirs qu’elle se dégageoit un peu pour céder 
aussitôt à une oppression nouvelle.’34 As for palpitations, they were frequently considered by 
physicians as a sign of vapours, although one had to be careful when considering a symptom that could 
indicate other pathologies.35 Lastly, the denial of a symptom could be as significant as its 
acknowledgement. As noted, ‘altered intestines’ (‘viscére vicié’) were typical of men of letters who 
frequently turned melancholic because of their unhealthy lifestyle. By negating this symptom and 
adding one that was not usually linked to vapours (‘fièvre lente’), Rousseau suggested his vapours were 
as exceptional as his urinary problems. Rousseau’s rhetoric of self-diagnosis depended on declaring 
that the aetiology of his pathologies was accidental, obscure and exceptional. 
 
In this overall rhetorical strategy, Rousseau encountered one difficulty: no matter how 
exceptional and obscure his pathology might be, he still had to fulfil his promise to reveal the chain of 
affections that would explain his whole life to the reader. Although he denied two common causes of 
vapours (a melancholic constitution and the writer’s lifestyle) and suggested his ailments were of an 
extraordinary nature, he still used the term ‘vapours’ and developed a moral aetiology akin to a 
hygienic approach. Passions classically constituted the sixth part of hygienic treaties, and Rousseau 
was not particularly original when he listed different passions as the causes of his sickness. These 
included his frustrated love for women, the enthusiastic study of music, ‘furious’ readings of novels, an 
excessive taste for chess, along with the unhealthy side effects of these passions such as the lack of 
sleep and his sedentary lifestyle.36 All of these causes had been extensively examined by hygienists, but 
Rousseau framed this aetiology according to his rhetorical goals: far from being a natural-born 
melancholic, he was the temporary victim of passions. To put it differently, whenever his passions 
stopped, his vapours would vanish too. Actually, he claimed that when his vapours entered a critical 
stage, his passions did indeed suddenly disappear: ‘cet accident qui devoit tuer mon corps ne tua que 
mes passions.’37 Granted that Rousseau’s way of interpreting such a medical misfortune once again 
reflects his tendency to believe in what Jean Starobinski called ‘telephism’, that is the intuition that the 
treatment ought to be found in the very malady one wishes to cure.38 Rousseau’s minute description of 
symptoms equals or even surpasses the level of detail to be found in the case literature of his time: 
[J]e sentis dans mon corps une révolution subite et presque inconcevable. Je ne saurois mieux la 
comparer qu’à une espéce de tempête qui s’eleva dans mon sang et gagna dans l’instant tous 
mes membres. Mes artéres se mirent à battre d’une si grande force que non seulement je sentois 
leur battement, mais que je l’entendois même et surtout celui des carotides. Un grand bruit 
d’oreilles se joignit à cela, et ce bruit étoit triple ou plustot quadruple, savoir: un 
bourdonnement grave et sourd, un murmure plus clair comme d’une eau courante, un sifflement 
très aigu, et le battement que je viens de dire [...]. Ce bruit interne étoit si grand qu’il m’ôta la 
finesse d’ouïe que j’avois auparavant.39 
Rousseau’s extremely detailed depiction of his symptoms might seem excessive, but it was probably 
nothing out of the ordinary for the eighteenth-century reader. In tune with his musical background, he 
went into even more detail than was expected when characterising sounds, but otherwise his semiology 
of a vaporous crisis was not particularly original. Sophie relied on the same kind of vocabulary to 
describe her vapours when consulting Dr Pierre Hunauld: ‘[C]ela étoit joint à un étonnement de tête, 
qui par d’importunes révolutions me sembloit se bouleverser continuellement. J’y sentois 
alternativement une tension, une plénitude, & puis un vide douloureux, qui, bizarrement suivi, ou 
même accompagné, d’un tintement dans les oreilles, d’une sorte de bruit sifflant, me renversoit 
absolument la cervelle. Mes tempes battoient, & augmentoient considérablement mes douleurs.’40 The 
fact that Rousseau’s way of perceiving and narrating vaporous symptoms was very similar to the 
medical narrative style of his time should not deter us from recognising the originality of his rhetorical 
use of this semiology. Within the narrative economy of the Confessions, this unexpected physical 
‘revolution’ which ‘killed [his] passions’ prefigures a deliberate moral reform (‘ma réforme 
personnelle’) aimed at definitively restoring self-love (amour de soi) in its pristine purity, unspoilt by 
comparative self-liking (amour-propre): ‘j’appliquai toutes les forces de mon ame à briser les fers de 
l’opinion, et à faire avec courage tout ce qui me paroissoit bien, sans m’embarrasser aucunement du 
jugement des hommes.’41 
 
In between Rousseau’s physical revolution and his moral reformation, the illumination of 
Vincennes – that is, the physical and moral crisis he experienced when he discovered the prize question 
proposed by the Academy of Dijon, ‘Si le rétablissement des sciences et des arts a contribué à 
corrompre ou à épurer les mœurs?’42 – plays a crucial role. It shaped his rhetorical strategy, which was 
based on the narration of crises, and on the staging of random causality. This rhetoric of rupture meets 
its ultimate threat when confronted with the kind of deterministic materialism professed by Diderot, 
because its pattern of explanation favours natural causes over external or ‘non-natural’ ones43 (i.e. 
physiology over hygiene), permanent constitution over sudden crises, continuity over rupture. In his 
Réfutation d’Helvétius, Diderot directly attacked Helvétius’s celebration of a nearly all-powerful 
education, but also undermined Rousseau’s ethos by depicting him as a sophist, whose first paradox 
merely revealed his underlying twisted temperament: 
Et vous [Helvétius] croyez que j’aurais passé trois ou quatre mois à étayer de sophismes un 
mauvais paradoxe; que j’aurais donné à ces sophismes-là toute la couleur qu’il [Rousseau] leur 
donna; et ensuite que je me serais fait un système philosophique de ce qui n’avait été d’abord 
qu’un jeu d’esprit. [...] 
 Rousseau fit ce qu’il devait faire parce qu’il était lui. Je n’aurais rien fait, ou j’aurais fait 
tout autre chose parce que j’aurais été moi. 
 Et lorsque Helvetius finit le paragraphe de Rousseau par ces mots, ‘Rousseau, ainsi 
qu’une infinité d’hommes illustres peut donc être regardé comme un des chefs-d’œuvres du 
hasard,’ je demande si cela peut avoir d’autres sens que le suivant; c’était un baril de poudre à 
canon ou d’or fulminant, qui serait peut-être resté sans explosion, sans l’étincelle qui partit de 
Dijon et qui l’enflamma.44 
As he recalls that ‘les accidents ne produisent rien’,45 Diderot denies circumstances – and therefore 
education – the power to alter passions and shape character. In tune with his advocacy of deterministic 
materialism, he assimilates character to the Hippocratic notion of temperament. The assumption that 
one’s passions derive from one’s temperament, and one’s temperament from one’s physical 
constitution (‘organisation’),46 allows Diderot to call Rousseau a natural-born sophist47 who had to 
become morally and intellectually entangled in a specious system once he entered the career of letters. 
Although Diderot does not specifically mention melancholy in this extract, the way he establishes a 
strong continuity or a quasi identity between (physical) constitution, (physical) temperament and 
(moral) character tends to make his rhetorical strategy –aimed at countering Rousseau’s ethos48 – very 
close to a diagnosis.49 
 
Vapours and sensibility 
 
Sometimes confronted by this kind of ‘essentialising’, though not always materialistic, diagnosis, 
Rousseau strove for subtlety and complexity when analysing himself. In the Dialogues (composed in 
1772-1776), he divides himself into ‘Rousseau’ the observer and ‘Jean-Jacques’ the object of enquiry, 
an enquiry led in front of ‘Le François’, who represents French public opinion. Although his self-
characterisation does not precisely constitute a self-diagnosis – after all, Rousseau comments on his 
own idiosyncrasies, not on his illnesses – he relies on medical concepts. But he uses these notions 
within a dualistic frame, thus avoiding the kind of physiological reduction his philosophical opponents 
frequently resorted to in order to dismiss his theories. In other words, even when venturing into 
physiology, he still relies on a physico-moral approach, closer in spirit to hygiene than to ‘enlightened’ 
physiology: 
S’animer modérement n’est pas une chose en sa puissance. Il faut qu’il soit de flamme ou de 
glace; quand il est tiede, il est nul. 
 Enfin j’ai remarqué que l’activité de son ame duroit peu, qu’elle étoit courte à 
proportion qu’elle étoit vive, que l’ardeur de ses passions les consumoit, les dévoroit elles-
mêmes [...]. 
 Voila le précis des observations d’où j’ai tiré la connoissance de sa constitution 
physique, et par des consequences necessaires, confirmées par sa conduite en toute chose, celle 
de son vrai caractére. Ces observations et les autres qui s’y rapportent offrent pour résultat un 
temperament mixte formé d’élemens qui paroissent contraires: un cœur sensible, ardent ou très 
inflammable; un cerveau compact et lourd, dont les parties solides et massives ne peuvent être 
ébranlées que par une agitation du sang vive et prolongée. Je ne cherche point à lever en 
physicien ces apparentes contradictions, et que m’importe? Ce qui m’importoit, étoit de 
m’assurer de leur réalité.50 
In this extract, Rousseau’s dualism cannot be considered orthodox. Although he takes for granted the 
interaction between body and soul, he seems to equate the ‘soul’s activity’ to strong passions. Such an 
assimilation would be a heresy for a Cartesian, as passions logically designate the passive state of the 
soul. Nevertheless, this implication is consistent with Rousseau’s moral anthropology, which regards 
self-love (amour de soi) as both the source of all passions and a truly dynamic force: to become 
animated (s’animer) means to have an active soul, or to be driven by an ebullient self-love. By saying 
that Rousseau takes some liberty with the Cartesian approach, I am not suggesting at all that he 
advocates a limited or a repressed materialism, a view recently held by some scholars.51 Throughout 
the eighteenth century, materialistic physicians and philosophers gradually replaced the body/soul 
duality by interactions between the heart and the brain – or the body and the mind, the body and the 
brain, and so on. Obviously, Rousseau also distances himself from Cartesian dualism in this passage, 
but he clearly subordinates the heart/brain binary to the analysis of his own temperament – an analysis 
which is itself instrumental in publicly establishing his true character. When asserting that his character 
derives by necessity (‘par des consequences necessaires’) from his mixed temperament, he steals from 
his philosophical opponents the persuasive strength of their deterministic statements, but he does so in 
a very circumscribed way. He rejects any full enquiry into the physiological causes of his temperament, 
as he undertakes self-characterisation not as a physicist – or a physiologist – but with a rhetorical 
purpose in mind.52 
 
The fact that this theoretical development is initially grounded on paranoid overinterpretation53 
is of little interest for our purpose. It is more fruitful to focus on the integration of theory and rhetoric 
in general,54 and on the link between counter-diagnosis and self-characterisation in particular. In the 
Confessions, Rousseau defended himself by unravelling the inner chain of affections that explained and 
justified the apparent inconsistencies of his behaviour. He attacks the rhetoric of deterministic 
continuity – used for instance by Diderot – by proposing a more elaborate explanatory model, though 
itself based on continuity. On the contrary, the Dialogues mark a shift in Rousseau’s polemical 
strategy, as he emphasises real contradictions, between the moral and the physical, and within the 
physical realm itself (‘temperament mixte’), in order to counter the continuity model. In this rhetorical 
context, self-characterisation prevails over introspection, and it becomes more important to show how 
sophisticated the lock is than to provide the reader with the key. Important theoretical distinctions that 
appear for the first time in the Dialogues should be read in the light of this rhetorical context. For 
instance, Rousseau establishes the difference between physical and moral sensibility in order to 
dissolve a unified and materialistic concept of sensibility developed by an unidentified English 
surgeon-philosopher (‘philosophe chirurgien’).55 Indeed, the notion of sensibility had long been 
associated with melancholy and vapours at the time of the Dialogues. David Hume’s allusion to 
Rousseau’s ‘extreme sensibility of temper’56 and Lamoignon de Malesherbes’s epistolary comment on 
his ‘extreme sensibility’ and ‘deep-seated inclination to melancholy’ (‘grand fond de melancholie’)57 
make obvious the (partial) epistemological shift from the humoral paradigm to the nervous one. It also 
demonstrates the extent to which the aforementioned association had become mainstream among the 
lay audience. Whereas, in the Confessions, Rousseau diagnoses himself with circumstantial vapours in 
order to counter the accusation of having a natural predisposition to melancholy, in the Dialogues, he 
dismisses the diagnoses of melancholy and vapours altogether. He now regards the so-called ‘nervous 
diseases’ (i.e. vapours)58 as fashionable symptoms caused by a misconception of moral sensibility in 
mundane circles: 
[Q]uoiqu’il s’anime assez fréquemment et souvent très vivement, je ne lui ai jamais vu de ces 
demonstrations affectées et convulsives, de ces singeries à la mode dont on nous a fait des 
maladies de nerfs. Ses émotions s’aperçoivent quoi qu’il ne s’agite pas: elles sont naturelles et 
simples comme son caractère; il est parmi tous ces énerguménes de sensibilité, comme une 
belle femme sans rouge qui n’ayant que les couleurs de la nature paroit pâle au milieu des 
visages fardés.59 
While Rousseau depicted himself as a true victim of vapours in the Confessions, he now considers that 
vaporous symptoms simply mimic the signs of moral sensibility. Instead of conveying the natural 
energy of self-love, the vaporous crowd merely reflects the highly artificial agitation induced by social 
pride. He later elaborates on this idea by presenting the heart/brain pair in a striking chiasmus: those 
who are genuinely sensitive are characterised by a lively heart and a slow mind, and inversely, those 
who are only superficially so have a dead cold heart and an overactive brain: ‘N’allons donc pas 
prendre, comme on fait dans le monde, pour des cœurs sensibles des cerveaux brulés.’60 Rousseau 
combines an old-fashioned medical terminology – ‘adust melancholy’ was originally supposed to be 
caused by overheated bile driven to the brain61 – with his own abstract moral dictionary. As a 
consequence he induces the reader to hesitate between literal and figurative interpretations. The climax 
of this deliberate confusion of the common medical discourse and his own moral anthropology is 
ultimately reached when, in the Rêveries, he retrospectively diagnoses himself with the ‘vapeurs de 
l’amour-propre’.62 By using the medical language of his time within a physico-moral theory of man, 
Rousseau was taking some liberty with the overtly simple dualism advocated by the Savoyard Vicar.63 
In his abandoned project entitled La Morale sensitive, ou le Matérialisme du sage, he was planning to 
use materialistic concepts against materialism itself;64 in his autobiographical works, he similarly 
perverted the medical discourse from the inside in order to reclaim the interpretation of his own life. 
These changes should encourage us to avoid a static vision of both Rousseau’s philosophical system 
and polemical strategy. 
 
Although Rousseau’s counter-diagnosis evolved during his lifetime, it was firmly grounded on 
a few principles. It was generally based on denying consultation while asking for professional advice, 
refuting the physicians’ diagnoses, and expressing one’s absolute singularity.65 Rousseau also resorted 
to classical – mostly Hippocratic – medical concepts like temperament, crisis or non-natural causes in 
order to counter what he perceived as defamatory diagnoses undermining his public image and 
consequently the success of his theories. In his self-narration, he was intent on presenting himself as a 
victim of circumstancial vapours, and on rejecting the accusation of being a natural-born melancholic. 
Rousseau was not concerned by the professional diagnosis in itself, but by its circulation, its influence 
on public opinion, during his lifetime and after his death, and the way it threatened a positive reception 
of his work by affecting the ethos pervading his writings. For this reason, counter-diagnosis – achieved 
through a mastery of self-narration – played a central role in the polemical struggle Rousseau led 
against his enlightened opponents. Rousseau was probably right in identifying the way diagnoses could 
be used by his philosophical opponents trying to debase his moral anthropology, but he was certainly 
wrong on one point: although he became for a long time the epitome of the melancholic thinker, his 
theories remained highly influential. One may even argue quite the contrary: the way medical literature 
continued to elaborate on Rousseau’s ‘case’ much after his death66 betrayed the physicians’ unflinching 
fascination with their nemesis and contributed to the Romantic revival of the Aristotelian figure of the 
melancholic genius among the general audience.67 His haunting presence in the medical discourse long 
after his death was made possible by his intimate knowledge of the most crucial debates and tensions 
animating this discipline. Though one of the most belligerent critics of medicine, he was consciously 
situating himself within the medical field, while condemning physicians in general.68 Rousseau not 
only proposed an ‘autocritique’ of Enlightenment, as Mark Hulliung convincingly suggested;69 he also 
formulated an ‘autocritique’ of medicine. 
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